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NO, YOU MAY NOT SEARCH MY CAR! EXTENDING
GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH TO VEHICLE SEARCHES
Alex Chan
Abstract: In Georgia v. Randolph, the United States Supreme Court announced that thirdparty consent does not always suffice to immunize the search of a residence from Fourth
Amendment attack. Specifically, the Court held that a police search of a residence conducted
pursuant to the consent of one occupant, but over the express refusal of a physically present
co-occupant with common authority, is unreasonable as to the nonconsenting occupant under
the Fourth Amendment. The Court did not indicate whether its holding also extended to
searches of personal effects, such as vehicles, conducted pursuant to third-party consent. As a
general principle, the Fourth Amendment does not protect an individual's expectation of
privacy in his vehicle to the same extent that it does in his residence. Where a search
proceeds on the basis of consent, however, the Court analyzes vehicle searches in the same
manner as residence searches. Furthermore, Court precedent suggests that a physically
present, nonconsenting party with common authority over the property to be searched does
not assume the risk that a third party with common authority will permit a search of that
property. In light of these considerations, and especially in the absence of evidence of widely
shared social expectations to the contrary, this Comment argues that courts should apply the
Randolph rule to searches of vehicles conducted pursuant to third-party consent.

One afternoon, Officer Calloway observes a man and a woman sitting
together on the hood of a car.' Although Calloway does not witness the
couple violating any laws, he nevertheless has a hunch that the car
contains illegal drugs.2 He approaches the two, a married couple named
Cyrus and Sarah, and asks who owns the vehicle. Cyrus tells the officer
that he and his wife jointly own the car. Calloway then asks Cyrus for
permission to search the vehicle; Cyrus refuses. Undeterred, Calloway
then asks Sarah for permission to conduct the search. Sarah, angry with
Cyrus for his recent extramarital affair, consents to the vehicle's search.
Calloway finds drug paraphernalia in the glove compartment.
A grand jury indicts Cyrus for possession of drug paraphernalia. At
trial, Cyrus moves to suppress this evidence as the direct product of an

1. Hypothetical scenario created by the author for illustrative purposes.
2. A police officer's hunch cannot serve as the basis for a lawful search under the Fourth
Amendment. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990) (citing United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). It satisfies neither the probable cause required for a warrantless search under
the automobile exception, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925), nor the lesser
standard of reasonable suspicion required for a protective search of the passenger compartment of a
vehicle, see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:377, 2007

unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.3 Specifically, Cyrus
argues that the search was unreasonable because the consent Calloway
received from Sarah could not properly serve as the basis for the search.
While conceding that Sarah gave her consent voluntarily, Cyrus claims it
was nonetheless unreasonable for Calloway to search the vehicle when
Cyrus was physically present and expressly refused to consent to the
search.
This Comment argues that the question raised by this hypotheticalwhether, in the face of Cyrus's explicit refusal to consent to the search of
the car, Sarah's consent is sufficient to transform what would otherwise
be an unreasonable warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment of
the couple's vehicle into a reasonable search-should be answered by
the limitation on the third-party consent rule announced in the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decision, Georgia v. Randolph.4 The Randolph
rule provides that where police search a house without a warrant but
with the consent of an occupant, that search is nevertheless unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment as to a co-occupant of the residence,
provided that the co-occupant is physically present at the time of the
search and expressly refuses to consent.5 As a result, any search
conducted solely pursuant to such third-party consent violates the Fourth
Amendment and, with limited exceptions not here relevant, all evidence
discovered as a result of the search must be suppressed in a criminal
prosecution of the physically present, nonconsenting co-occupant.6
Although the Court did not address in Randolph whether this rule
extends to searches of personal effects such as vehicles, the decision's
underlying rationale militates in favor of such an extension. The
Randolph Court primarily justified its rule by concluding that it is not a

3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."); see also Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914) ("To sanction [the use of illegally obtained evidence in a prosecution of
the accused] would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of
the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such
unauthorized action.").
4. 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
5. Id. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1526.
6. See id. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 1528. The Court first held in Weeks v. United States that the Fourth
Amendment bars the use in federal criminal prosecutions of evidence secured through a violation
thereof. 232 U.S. at 393-94, 398. The Court applied this prohibition to state criminal prosecutions
via the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

Vehicle Searches
"widely shared social expectation" for an occupant of a residence to
admit a visitor when a co-occupant is physically present and expresses
her desire that the visitor not enter.' The Court reached this conclusion
by examining social practice. 8 The reasoning adopted by the Court to
justify the Randolph rule largely applies to vehicle searches as well. 9
Specifically, it is not a widely shared social expectation that one with
common authority over a vehicle would admit a party therein when
another person with common authority over the vehicle is physically
present and expressly states a wish that the party not enter.10
Part I of this Comment discusses exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Part II compares the Court's
treatment of residential and vehicle searches under the Fourth
Amendment. Part III outlines pre-Randolph case law governing searches
conducted pursuant to consent. Part IV explores the reasoning
underlying the Randolph rule. Finally, using the hypothetical introduced
above, Part V argues that the Randolph rule should also apply to vehicle
searches conducted pursuant to third-party consent.
I.

SOME WARRANTLESS SEARCHES ARE REASONABLE
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Even if warrantless, a search may still be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.11 The requirements of the Fourth Amendment only apply
to governmental action," and only prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. 13 Furthermore, governmental action that does not intrude upon
7. Randolph, 547 U.S. at-_,

126 S. Ct. at 1521-23.

8. See id.
9. See infra Part V.A.

10. See infra Part V.A.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799 (1982) (explaining that the Court had
previously held that a warrantless search of a vehicle conducted with probable cause to believe that
the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment (citing Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). See also generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.1(b) (4th ed. 2004).
12. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-114 (1984).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) ("What [the
defendant] is assured by the Fourth Amendment itself, however, is not that no government search of
his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is 'unreasonable.').
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures also applies to
state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.").
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a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy" does not even constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 14 In order for a search to be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the government must first
obtain a search warrant unless an exception applies.15 The Court has
created exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches wherein the
governmental interest in conducting the search outweighs the
intrusiveness of the search on the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 16 The exclusionary rule usually bars the government from
introducing in a criminal prosecution any evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. 17
A.

The Fourth Amendment Only Applies to Governmental Conduct
that Constitutes a Search or Seizure

The Fourth Amendment protects "the people.., against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' 8 However, the Fourth Amendment only applies
to a search or seizure effected by the government.1 9 Furthermore, not all
such governmental 2action
constitutes a "search" for purposes of the
0
Fourth Amendment.
Governmental conduct does not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment if it does not intrude on a person's "reasonable expectation
of privacy.,

21

In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, 22 Justice

14. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (emphasizing that warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but for a few well-delineated
exceptions).
16. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331-34 (1990) (concluding that a warrantless
protective sweep of a house incident to the arrest of someone therein is reasonable because the
governmental interest in the safety of officers at the arrest scene outweighs the intrusion on the
arrestee's reasonable expectation of privacy).
17. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471,484 (1963); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Id.; see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-114 (1984) ("This Court has also
consistently construed this protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly
inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not
acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental
official."' (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
20. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that police do not
engage in a search under the Fourth Amendment when they look through garbage bags left for
collection on the curb outside of a home).
21. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
360, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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Harlan indicated that the Court had used a two-part test to determine
whether governmental action constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment: first, whether the individual possesses an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy, and second, whether society is prepared to
recognize that expectation as reasonable.23 Governmental action that
intrudes into a home, for example, constitutes a search under this test
because homeowners actually expect privacy in their homes and society
recognizes that this expectation of privacy is reasonable.24
By contrast, governmental action that intrudes upon an expectation of
privacy that society does not recognize as reasonable is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment, even if the individual possesses an actual
expectation of privacy in the area or thing searched.25 For example, in
Oliver v. United States,26 the Court held that individuals possess no
reasonable expectation of privacy in activities conducted in "open
fields" despite the presence of fences and "No Trespassing" signs that
presumably indicated a subjective expectation of privacy.27 The Court
reasoned that society does not recognize an expectation of privacy in
open fields as reasonable because: open fields do not serve as settings
for "intimate activities"; barriers and signs are not usually effective in
excluding the public; and such property may be surveyed aerially.2 8
Thus, the police can intrude upon a person's open fields without having
to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.29
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that a person's expectation of privacy in a
telephone conversation conducted in a closed public booth is one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable and is therefore protected by the Fourth Amendment). Although Justice
Harlan articulated his test in a concurrence, the Court has since adopted the two-part test he
articulated and has further recognized the objective element as the key inquiry into whether a search
even occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 101
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (using
Harlan's test as the Katz two-party inquiry).
24. Cf Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990) (finding that even an overnight houseguest
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the host's home).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-24 (1984) (holding that a chemical
test that only discloses whether a particular substance is cocaine does not constitute a search
because it does not intrude upon any reasonable expectation of privacy); see generally United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (stating that a search is only unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment if it intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy (citing United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1997))).
26. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
27. Id. at 178-81.
28, Id. at 179.
29. Id. at 182-83. Police may nonetheless be criminally or civilly liable under state trespass laws
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WarrantlessSearches Are Generally UnreasonableUnder the
Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized., 30 The Court has often referred to this provision as the "warrant
requirement ' 31 and generally interprets it to prohibit the police from
conducting a search without first acquiring a search warrant.32
Furthermore, a judge may issue a search warrant only when satisfied that
probable cause exists to believe that the search will uncover evidence of
a crime.3 3 Some warrantless searches are reasonable, however, because
the Court has created specific and well-delineated exceptions to the
warrant requirement.3 4
C.

The Court EstablishesExceptions to the WarrantRequirement by
Balancing Competing Interests

In determining whether to create an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the Court balances the legitimate
governmental interests in conducting the search against the degree to
which the search intrudes upon an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy.35 One example of an exception to the warrant requirement is an
for intruding on an individual's property. See id. at 183 & n.15.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. See, e.g., Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984).
32. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause"); see also Katz,
389 U.S. at 357 (explaining that except for a few well-delineated exceptions, the Court has held
searches conducted without the prior approval of a judge or magistrate to be per se unreasonable).
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; see, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) (describing
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement as applicable to situations where police
are in "hot pursuit" of a suspect who runs into a residence or where the suspect would destroy
evidence if he is not searched immediately (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300
(1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966))); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident to a
lawful arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (creating an exception to the warrant
requirement for the frisk of a suspect conducted pursuant to an officer's reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the suspect was armed and presently dangerous).
35. Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006); see also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,
331 (1990) ("Our cases show that in determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
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inventory search of an impounded vehicle conducted pursuant to
standardized procedures. 36 The government has legitimate interests in
conducting such a search-both in securing the property that it has taken
into custody against unauthorized interference and in protecting police
37
officers and others from any danger that the property may pose.
Although people do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
vehicles, the intrusion imposed by a routine inventory search on that
interest is deemed insufficient to outweigh the legitimate governmental
38
interests in conducting inventory searches.
D.

The ExclusionaryRule GenerallyProhibitsIntroduction of
Evidence Obtainedas a Result of an UnreasonableSearch

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to deter
violations of the Fourth Amendment. 39 It applies to both direct and
derivative evidence obtained from an illegal search.4 ° When a court
concludes that evidence has a direct or derivative relationship to an
illegal search, it will usually prohibit the government from using that
evidence against the person whose reasonable expectation of privacy
was intruded upon by the search. 41 For example, if a court analyzing the
interests."); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) ("[The] [r]easonableness [of a
particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security), of course, depends 'on a balance
between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers."' (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878
(1975))).
36. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 370 (1987). Police generally do not need a warrant to
search a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe that a search of the vehicle will uncover
evidence of a crime. See infra Part II.B.
37. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73 (reviewing inventory search decisions holding that governmental
interests outweigh the intrusion on the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
38. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372.
39. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974)).
40. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). The Court refers to the derivative evidence
of an illegal search as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See, e.g., id. (citing Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). An example of derivative evidence is testimony from a witness
identified as the result of an illegal search. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4,
at 256 (4th ed. 2004).
41. See Segura, 468 U.S. at 804. However, the prosecution can use illegally obtained evidence to
impeach the defendant. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980) (holding that the
government can use illegally obtained evidence to impeach statements made by the defendant
during cross-examination); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (holding that the
government can use illegally obtained evidence to impeach the defendant's direct testimony).
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hypothetical fact pattern involving Cyrus and Sarah found Calloway's
search of their vehicle unreasonable, the drug paraphernalia found
during the search would constitute direct evidence of the illegal search
and could not be used in the prosecution's case against Cyrus.42
In sum, the Fourth Amendment only applies to unreasonable
governmental action that constitutes a "search" or "seizure," as those
terms have been interpreted by the Court. Governmental action
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment only if it intrudes
upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, unless
an exception applies, warrantless searches are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. The Court has created exceptions for certain
warrantless searches where the governmental interest in conducting the
search outweighs the intrusion upon the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy. The government generally may not in a criminal
prosecution introduce evidence uncovered directly or derivatively from
an illegal search against the person whose reasonable expectation of
privacy was intruded upon.
II.

THE COURT TREATS SEARCHES OF HOUSES
DIFFERENTLY FROM SEARCHES OF VEHICLES

The Court recognizes that people possess a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their vehicles.4 3 Vehicles are personal effects,4 4 which are
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.4 5 However, as evidenced by the number of exceptions to
the warrant requirement pertaining to vehicles, the Court considers
warrantless vehicle searches less intrusive than warrantless residence
searches. 46 Despite this lesser protection afforded vehicle searches, the
Court has unequivocally stated that the Fourth Amendment protects a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle--even if that
expectation is markedly lower than it is in the home.47
42. Cf Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ("The essence of [the
Fourth Amendment in] forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.").
43. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985).
44. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their... effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
46. See infra Part II.B.
47. Cf United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) ("A search, even of an automobile, is a
substantial invasion of privacy.").

Vehicle Searches
A.

The Court Considers ResidentialSearches Extremely Intrusive
Given the Home's Special Place in FourthAmendment
Jurisprudence

Fourth Amendment protection is at its strongest when the place
searched is a house. The Fourth Amendment explicitly protects
"houses." 48 For centuries, people have placed stock in the "ancient adage
that a man's house is his castle, 49 and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
recognizes a special place for the home.5 0 The Court has stated that "the
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.'
B.

The Court Recognizes an Automobile Exception to the Warrant
Requirement

The Court consistently recognizes that searches of residences are
more intrusive than searches of vehicles, 52 and has created an
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement.5 3 This exception
applies to warrantless vehicle searches conducted with probable cause to
believe that the search will uncover evidence of a crime. 4 Warrantless

48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
50. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("'At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion."' (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961))); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." (quoting United States v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (alteration in original))).
51. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
52. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (explaining that "the
expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to
one's home or office").
53. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
52 (1970) ("For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and
holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand
carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."). But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
458-64 (1971) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the argument that police can conduct a search of a
vehicle whenever they have probable cause to do so if exigent circumstances are lacking). By
contrast, "[w]ith few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable
and hence constitutional must be answered no." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
54. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925). Historically, a vehicle has been subject
to this exception only if it is readily mobile and present in a setting that objectively indicates its use
for transportation. Carney, 471 U.S. at 393-94 (holding that defendant's motor home constituted a
vehicle for purposes of the automobile exception). Furthermore, this exception only allows police to
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searches of vehicles conducted with the requisite probable cause are
permissible because, under the balancing test discussed above, the
governmental interest in conducting the search outweighs the resulting
intrusion on the vehicle owner's reasonable expectation of privacy.
Initially, the Court focused on the strength of the governmental interest
as the primary justification for the exception, emphasizing that police
may not be able to procure a search warrant before a suspect drives
away.56 The Court has subsequently shifted its focus to the limited
intrusiveness of a warrantless vehicle search, observing that people
know that their vehicles are subject to pervasive governmental
regulation. 7 Furthermore, much of the passenger compartment of a
standard vehicle is open to plain view.58 In contrast, no such exception
exists for the search of a home because the intrusiveness of a warrantless
residential search on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
therein usually outweighs the governmental interest in conducting the
search. 59

Moreover, the Court has created several exceptions to the warrant
requirement for vehicle searches even where police do not possess
probable cause to believe that a search will uncover evidence of crime.
First, police can, in the absence of probable cause, search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle incident to the lawful arrest of an occupant or
recent occupant.6 °

Second, the police can

search the passenger

search those areas of the vehicle where the evidence sought might plausibly be found. Cf California
v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (explaining that the search of an entire vehicle for marijuana
would have been unreasonable because the searching officers only had probable cause to believe
that the marijuana was in a paper bag in the vehicle's trunk).
55. Cf Carroll,267 U.S. at 149 ("The Fourth Amendment is to be construed ... in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.").
56. Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-91 (noting that the ready mobility of the vehicle served as the
original justification for the exception's establishment in Carroll).
57. Id. at 393 (noting that "there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from [a vehicle's]
use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation").
58. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). But cf Carney, 471 U.S. at 392 (stating that
a person's reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle does not derive from the plain view nature of
a vehicle, but rather "from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public
highways").
59. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) ("[A] search of the house or office is
generally not reasonable without a warrant issued on probable cause."); cf Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (observing that "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house" in dismissing the argument that an entry into a residence to search for a
person is less intrusive than an entry to search for property).
60. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623-24 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460 (1981).
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compartment of a vehicle without probable cause if they have a
reasonable and articulable belief that a dangerous suspect may
immediately gain control of weapons from his vehicle. 6 1 Third, as
described above, police can conduct routine inventory searches of
impounded vehicles without any probable cause to believe that the
search will uncover evidence of criminal activity.62 Finally, police can
search a vehicle without probable cause if they receive valid consent to
such action. 63
C.

Despite the Lessened Expectation of Privacy in Vehicles, the
FourthAmendment Protectsan Individual's Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy Therein

Despite creating many exceptions to the warrant requirement for
vehicle searches, the Court continues to maintain that the Fourth
Amendment protects the reasonable expectation of privacy that people
have in their vehicles. 64 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,65 a four-justice
plurality emphasized: "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. 6 6 Even
though police had probable cause, the Coolidge plurality refused to
apply the "automobile exception" to a search of a vehicle parked in the
defendant's driveway because none of the exigencies used to justify the
exception were present.6 7 Furthermore, the automobile exception does

61. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
62. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
372 (1976).
63. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
64. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) ("A search, even of an automobile, is a
substantial invasion of privacy.").
65. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
66. Id. at 461-62 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 460-64 (plurality opinion) ("[T]here was probable cause [to search the defendant's
vehicle], but no exigent circumstances justified the police in proceeding without a warrant."). In
Cardwell v. Lewis, the Court held a warrantless search of the exterior of an automobile, conducted
with probable cause, to be constitutional. 417 U.S. 583, 591-92 (1974). The police had conducted
the search after seizing the automobile from a public parking lot and moving it to the police
impoundment lot. Id. at 587-88. One way in which the Court distinguished the vehicle seizure in
Cardwell from the vehicle seizure in Coolidge was that the vehicle in Cardwell was "seized from a
public place where access was not meaningfully restricted." See id. at 593. But see Maryland v.
Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam) (observing that "the automobile exception does not
have a separate exigency requirement" (citing Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)
(per curiam))).
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not allow police to search an entire vehicle if they have probable cause
to believe that they will find contraband only in a certain part of the
vehicle. 68
In sum, the Court considers the search of a house to be more invasive
than the search of a vehicle. The Court has created an exception for
warrantless searches of vehicles supported by probable cause because
the governmental interest in conducting the search outweighs the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Nevertheless, despite the
numerous exceptions that it has created to the warrant requirement for
vehicle searches, the Court maintains that a vehicle search constitutes a
significant intrusion on an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy, and as such is still a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
III.

THE COURT HAS CREATED AN EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR SEARCHES CONDUCTED
PURSUANT TO THIRD-PARTY CONSENT

Valid consent exempts a search from the warrant requirement. 69 The
consent doctrine applies to vehicle searches in the same manner that it
applies to searches of residences and other personal effects. 70 The Court
has also extended the consent doctrine to searches conducted pursuant to
third-party consent under the rationale that one assumes the risk that
another person with common authority over the property or effect will
permit the police to search it. 71 Furthermore, dicta in one of the Court's
leading third-party consent cases suggests that this assumption-of-risk
principle justifies application of the third-party consent exception
regardless of the level of Fourth Amendment protection for the
reasonable expectation of privacy at stake. 72 However, language in that
same case hints that the exception for searches conducted pursuant to
third-party consent does not apply to physically present, nonconsenting
73
parties.
68. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
69. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("[O]ne of the specifically established
exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to consent.").
70. See infra Part III.B.
71. See infra Part III.C.
72. See infra Part IlI.C.
73. See infra Part III.D.
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A.

A Warrantless Search Conducted Pursuantto Valid ConsentIs
Reasonable Under the FourthAmendment

A warrantless search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if a
person validly consents to the search.74 Such consent is valid only if the
individual both consented voluntarily7 5 and had either actual or apparent
authority over the area searched.76 In determining whether a person
voluntarily consented, courts examine the totality of the circumstances.77
If a person validly consents to a search, any evidence discovered in the
course of that search is admissible against her at trial.7 8
Given valid consent, not only may evidence discovered be admissible
against the consenting individual, but it may also be admissible against
other individuals with common authority over the area searched.7 9
Matlock v. United States80 provides an example of the Court's
application of this "third-party consent" doctrine. After arresting the
defendant in his yard, the police conducted a search of his house
pursuant to the consent of one of his co-residents. 8' The Matlock Court
noted that the cash discovered by police in the warrantless search of the
residence could be admitted against the defendant if the third party that
82
consented had common authority over the searched residence.

74. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.
75. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 165-66 (explaining that Schneckloth had "reaffirmed the principle
that the search of property, without warrant and without probable cause, but with proper consent
voluntarily given, is valid under the Fourth Amendment" (emphasis added)).
76. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 16.02[A] (4th ed. 2006); cf Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (finding that a
search conducted pursuant to third-party consent would be unlawful if consenter lacked actual and
apparent authority to consent). A third party has apparent authority over property if a law
enforcement official could reasonably believe that individual to possess common authority over that
property. Id.
77. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (describing such circumstances to include the characteristics of
the accused and the details of the interrogation); see also infra Part III.B.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976) (reversing the appellate
court's suppression of evidence found in a search of the defendant's vehicle on the basis that the
defendant voluntarily consented to the search).
79. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179-8 1.
80. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
81. Id. at 166.
82. See id. at 177-78 (remanding to the district court to determine whether the third party who
consented to the search of the residence possessed sufficient authority to validly do so).
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Determinationof the Validity of Consent to a Search Is the Same
for Residences, Vehicles, and Other PersonalEffects

Supreme Court precedent affords individuals a lesser expectation of
privacy in their vehicles than in their residences 83 and some other
personal effects.8 4 Nevertheless, the Court applies the consent exception
to vehicles in the same manner that it applies the doctrine to residences
and other personal effects.
The Court has applied the same consent analysis it used in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, its leading consent case in the context of a
vehicle search, to subsequent cases involving residential searches. In
Schneckloth, a passenger consented to a search of the vehicle. 86 The
vehicle was owned by the consenting passenger's brother, who was not
present at the scene. 87 At issue was the proof necessary for the state to
satisfy the voluntariness requirement of the consent doctrine.8 8 The
Court in Schneckloth emphasized that the government did not need to
establish that the consenting party possessed knowledge of his right to
refuse consent in order to prove that his consent was voluntary.89
Similarly, but in the context of a residential search, the consenting party
in Matlock did not receive any warning that she could refuse to
consent. 90 Referring explicitly to Schneckloth, the Court repeated that to
establish voluntariness, the government need not show the consenter's
knowledge of the right to refuse consent. 91 Thus, the Court in Matlock
did not require the government to establish a higher standard of consent
just because the search was of a residence. Instead, the Court indicated
its acceptance of a rule that it had established in the context of a vehicle

83. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (distinguishing the search of a residence
from other types of searches).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (stating that a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy in his personal luggage is substantially stronger than in his automobile).
85. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
86. Id. at 220.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 223.
89. Id. at 227 ("While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into
account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective
consent.").
90. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 167 n.2 (1974); see also supra text accompanying
notes 80-82.
91. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 167 n.2 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218).
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search, despite the reduced expectation of privacy in vehicles as
compared to houses.
The Schneckloth analysis also applies to consent searches of other
personal effects. Schneckloth held that the voluntariness of a person's
consent is a question of fact to be determined by examining the totality
of the circumstances.92 In United States v. Drayton,93 the Court used the
same totality of the circumstances approach to evaluate whether a
defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his luggage bag,a--even
though individuals possess a substantially lesser expectation of privacy
in vehicles than in personal luggage.95 As in Matlock, the Court did not
use a different standard for determining the validity of consent than the
one it used for vehicle searches, even though a greater reasonable
expectation of privacy was at issue in Drayton than in Schneckloth.
C.

Assumption of Risk Justifies the Exceptionfor Searches Based on
Third-Party Consent

The Court justifies its creation of an exception for searches conducted
pursuant to third-party consent on the basis that all individuals with
common authority over a property have assumed the risk that one of
them may permit a search thereof. 96 In Frazierv. Cupp, 97 for example,
police searched the defendant's duffel bag after obtaining the consent of
his cousin. 98 The defendant and his cousin used the bag jointly; at the
time of the search, the duffel bag had been left at the cousin's
residence. 99 The Court upheld the search as reasonable because the
defendant had, under these circumstances, assumed the risk that his
cousin would allow someone else to look into the bag. 100
The assumption-of-risk principle used to justify searches conducted
pursuant to third-party consent applies regardless of the strength of the
reasonable expectation of privacy at issue. Individuals have a greater
92. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
93. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
94. See id. at 207.
95. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
96. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170-71; see Lesley McCall, Casenote, Georgia v. Randolph: Whose
Castle Is It, Anyway?, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 589, 592 (2007).
97. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
98. Id. at 740.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in their residences than they do in
their personal effects.'0 1 Nevertheless, the assumption-of-risk principle
applies both to searches of residences102 and to searches of personal
effects. 10 3 Therefore, the assumption-of-risk principle likely extends to
any search conducted pursuant to third-party consent, regardless of the
amount of protection that the Fourth Amendment provides the privacy
interest at stake.
D.

The Exception for Searches ConductedPursuantto Third-Party
Consent May Be Limited by Matlock and Frazier to Absent,
Nonconsenting Parties

The Court in Matlock implied that the assumption-of-risk rationale
may not extend to physically present, nonconsenting parties. 0 4 Its
decision utilized the assumption-of-risk principle articulated in Frazier
as one justification for holding that residential searches are reasonable
when conducted pursuant to the consent of a third party with common
authority over the premises.' 0 5 However, in describing its third-party
consent jurisprudence, the Court stated in Matlock: "The consent of one
who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as
against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is

101. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (noting that the sanctity of
private dwellings is "ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection"); see
also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("The Fourth Amendment, and the
personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."); I WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3, at 554 (4th ed. 2004) ("Indeed, one's dwelling has
generally been viewed as the area most resolutely protected by the Fourth Amendment."). The
authors of a prominent criminal procedure casebook question, in light of Acevedo, whether a
warrant is still required to search a container having no connection with a vehicle. See YALE
KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 387 (11 th ed. 2005).
102. Matlock v. United States, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) ("The authority which justifies the
third-party consent.., rests.., on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed
the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.").
103. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740 ("[Defendant], in allowing [his cousin] to use the bag and in
leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that [his cousin] would allow
someone else to look inside.").
104. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.
105. Id. at 171; see also McCall, supra note 96, at 592.
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shared., 10 6 The emphasized limiting language strongly implies that only
nonconsenting parties who are physically absent are subject to the
assumption-of-risk principle
used to justify searches conducted pursuant
07
to third-party consent. 1
Neither the Frazier nor Matlock decisions explicitly stated that the
respective defendants were absent at the time of the challenged search.
However, the defendant's absence can be inferred from Frazier;Matlock
10 8
presents Frazier as a case relying upon the absence of the defendant.
In Georgia v. Randolph,'0 9 the Court characterized the Matlock
defendant as absent" 0 and then used his absence to distinguish the two
cases. 11' That the Court has emphasized the absence of the defendants in
Matlock and Frazier at the time consent to search was sought from a
third party lends further support to the argument that only absent,
nonconsenting parties are subject to the assumption-of-risk principle. If
the absence of these individuals constituted an irrelevant factor in
determining whether they assumed the risk that a third party would
odd that the Court has
permit a search of their property, then it seems
2
highlighted their absences as a pertinent fact."
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Cf Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1527 (2006).
108. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-71. The Court in Matlock observed that "more recent authority
here clearly indicates that the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or
effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. Id.
at 170 (emphasis added). The Court then immediately proceeded to describe the facts of Frazier.Id.
at 170-71.
109. 547 U.S.

-_, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).

110. Id. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 (noting that "the Matlock defendant was not present with the
opportunity to object"). The defendant's absence in Matlock was not of his own volition. Matlock,
415 U.S. at 166 (explaining that the defendant had been arrested in the front yard of his house). In
his dissent, Justice Douglas noted that after the police arrested the defendant in the front yard, they
"restrained [him] in a squad car a distance from the home" and then sought consent to search the
house from a co-resident. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
I II.

Randolph, 547 U.S. at __,

126 S. Ct. at 1527.

112. Notably, the Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez used a similar analytic approach in holding that
searches conducted pursuant to apparent consent were reasonable. See 497 U.S. 177, 188-89
(1990). The Court dismissed the argument that it had previously held such searches to be
unreasonable. Id. at 187-88. To the contrary, the Court observed that some of the language in
Stoner v. California, a third-party consent case dealing with the issue of whether a hotel clerk had
common authority over a guest's hotel room, provided support for its holding in Rodriguez. Id. at
187-88. In Stoner, the Court had stated that there was no evidence to indicate "that the police had
any basis whatsoever to believe that" the guest had authorized the hotel clerk to permit a search of
his room. 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964). The Rodriguez Court noted that the quoted language from
Stoner could reasonably be read as emphasizing the unreasonableness of a police officer's belief
that a hotel clerk had the authority to consent to such a search. 497 U.S. at 188 ("It is at least a
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In sum, valid third-party consent constitutes an exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements. The
Court applies the third-party consent exception in the same manner to all
forms of property, regardless of whether the property searched is a
vehicle, other personal effect, or a residence. The rationale for
establishing the third-party consent exception is that an individual with
common authority over the searched property assumed the risk that
others with common authority would permit police search thereof. This
assumption-of-risk principle appears to justify any search conducted
pursuant to third-party consent, regardless of the fact that the Fourth
Amendment provides greater protection to some reasonable expectations
of privacy than others. Finally, language in Matlock implies that this
assumption-of-risk principle, and thus the third-party consent exception,
extends only to absent-and not to present-nonconsenting parties.
IV. GEORGIA V.RANDOLPH IMPOSED A NEW LIMITATION ON
THE THIRD-PARTY CONSENT DOCTRINE
In Georgia v. Randolph, the U.S. Supreme Court made explicit what
it had merely implied in Matlock. The Court held that the warrantless
search of a residence, conducted pursuant to the consent of one
occupant, is unreasonable as to a physically present co-occupant who
expressly objects to the search. 1 3 The Court justified this rule on the
basis that there is no "widely shared social expectation" that the wish of
one occupant of a residence to admit a visitor will prevail over the
express contrary wish of another, physically present co-occupant. 114 The
Court concluded that the intrusion of a warrantless search based on
disputed consent on the objecting occupant's reasonable expectation of

reasonable reading of the case, and perhaps a preferable one, that the police could not rely upon the
obtained consent because they knew it came from a hotel clerk, knew that the room was rented and
exclusively occupied by the defendant, and could not reasonably have believed that the former had
general access to or control over the latter."). The Rodriguez Court thus concluded that Stoner
would not have used this language had it intended to hold third-party searches conducted pursuant
to apparent authority unreasonable. Id.
113. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. _, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519, 1526 (2006). This rule may not
apply when the people living together fall within a recognized hierarchy making it apparent that
they do not share equal authority over the residence. See id.at __, 126 S.Ct. at 1523. An example
of such a hierarchy is that of a parent and child. Id. This issue is outside the scope of this Comment.
114. See id. at-_,

126 S.Ct. at 1521, 1523.
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privacy outweighed the governmental interest in conducting that
search. 115
A.

Police Searched Scott Randolph's Residence over his Express
Objection, Relying Instead on his Wife's Consent

On July 6, 2001, Janet Randolph summoned the police to her6
residence, a home that she formerly shared with her husband, Scott."
She informed one of the officers, Sergeant Murray, that Scott was a drug17
user and that "items of drug evidence" were present in their home."
Sergeant Murray asked Scott, who was physically present at the door of
the house, for his consent to search the residence. 1 8 Scott unequivocally
refused to provide the requested consent.1 9 Murray then asked Janet for
her consent to search the residence. 120 She readily provided the requested
consent 12 ' and led Murray to an upstairs bedroom where he observed
evidence of drug paraphernalia in plain view.' 22 The observed drug
paraphernalia allowed police to obtain a warrant to search the residence,
evidence was used to indict Scott for possession of
and the resulting
23
cocaine. 1

At trial, Scott moved to suppress the evidence of cocaine found in his
residence as the product of an illegal warrantless search. Although the
search was conducted pursuant to his wife's consent, Scott claimed that
consent to be invalid in light of his express refusal. 24 The trial court
rejected his motion, but the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed and
granted his motion to suppress. 25 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
U.S.
the appellate court's reversal. 126 In Georgia v. Randolph, the
27
Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court's judgment.1

115. Id. at
116. Id. at

-,

126 S. Ct. at 1523-24.
126S. Ct. at 1519.

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at __,

126 S. Ct. at 1520.
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It Is Not a Widely Shared Social Expectation that the Wish of an
Occupant to Admit a Visitor into a Shared Residence Will Prevail
over a Present Co-Occupant'sExpress Wish to the Contrary

In explaining its decision, the Randolph Court stated that "[t]he
constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the
consent cases... is the great significance given to widely shared social
expectations."' 28 Applying this methodology in Randolph, the Court
found no widely shared social expectation that an occupant of a
residence may admit a visitor against the express contrary wish of a cooccupant. 2 9 The Court looked to social practice, 30 paying particular
attention to social expectations regarding overnight houseguests. In
Minnesota v. Olson, 13 the Court had already concluded that the host of
an overnight houseguest would be "unlikely [to] admit someone who
''
wants to see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest. 32
Importing its Olson observations, the Court in Randolph reasoned that if
it is customary for a host to so defer to an overnight guest, it would be
logical to conclude that an occupant would accord the same deferenceif not more-to the wishes of co-occupants. 133 The Court did not believe
that a sensible person invited by one occupant would
enter the residence
34
if "a fellow tenant stood there saying, 'stay out.""

C.

A Residential Search Conducted Pursuantto an Occupant's
Consent Is Unreasonableas to a Physically Present,
Nonconsenting Co-Occupant

The Randolph Court found that a present, nonconsenting occupant's
reasonable expectation of privacy outweighs the government's interest in
conducting a search based on a co-occupant's consent. 135 An
128. Id. at __,126 S.Ct. at 1521 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at
, 126 S.Ct. at 1522-23.
130. Id. In addition to its exploration of social practice, the Court also turned to property law in
its examination of widely shared social expectations. See id. at -,

126 S. Ct. at 1521. The Court

stated that property law's treatment of the nature of co-occupancy was influential, but not
controlling, as to what constituted widely shared social expectations pertaining to shared authority
over a residence. Id.
131. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
132. Id. at 99.
133. Randolph, 547 U.S. at -_,126 S. Ct. at 1522.
134. Id. at-, 126 S.Ct. at 1522-23.
135. Id. at -, 126 S.Ct. at 1523-24.
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individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in his house is
particularly strong due to the longstanding judicial respect accorded to
the privacy of the home. 136 In addition, the Court reasoned that the
disputed consent did not strengthen an already weak governmental
interest in conducting a warrantless residential search. 37 Indeed, it
observed that a search conducted pursuant to such consent was38
tantamount to conducting a search pursuant to no consent at all.
Because the balance of the competing interests weighs in favor of the
physically present, nonconsenting occupant's reasonable expectation of
privacy in his home, 39 a search conducted pursuant to a co-occupant's
consent is unreasonable
as to the nonconsenting occupant under the
40
Fourth Amendment.
In sum, the Court in Randolph held that a warrantless search of a
residence, conducted over a physically present occupant's express
refusal to consent, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment as to
the objector if the only basis for the search was a co-occupant's consent.
The Court found no widely shared social expectation that an occupant's
wish to admit a visitor into the residence will prevail over a present cooccupant's express wish to exclude that third party. Furthermore, an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in his home outweighs the
governmental interest in conducting a warrantless search pursuant to
disputed consent.
V.

THE RANDOLPH RULE SHOULD EXTEND TO VEHICLE
SEARCHES BASED ON THIRD-PARTY CONSENT

Courts should apply the Randolph rule to vehicle searches conducted
pursuant to third-party consent. A vehicle search justified solely by the
consent of one with common authority over the vehicle is unreasonable
as to another physically present, nonconsenting person who shares in
that common authority. It is unlikely that society possesses a shared
expectation that someone with common authority over a vehicle will
admit a party therein if another person with common authority over the
vehicle is physically present and objects. 141 In addition, an individual's
136. Id.
137. Id. at

, 126 S. Ct. at 1523.

138. Id.
139. Id. at

, 126 S. Ct. at 1524.

140. Id. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 1526.
141. See infra Part V.A.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:377, 2007

reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle over which he possesses
common authority outweighs the governmental interest in searching the
vehicle pursuant to disputed consent. This is true notwithstanding the
fact that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle is
weaker than in a residence. 142 Therefore, in the hypothetical presented
above, a court should hold that the search of the vehicle jointly owned
by Cyrus and Sarah is unreasonable as to Cyrus under the Fourth
Amendment. 143
A.

The Assumption-of-Risk PrincipleDoes Not Apply to a Vehicle
Search when an Individual with Common Authority over the
Vehicle Is Physically Presentand Expressly Objects

The third-party consent exception is justified on the assumption-ofrisk rationale. 144 This rationale applies to the search of any type of
145
property, regardless of the reasonable expectation of privacy at issue.
However, the Court has explicitly restricted the applicability of the thirdparty consent exception to residential searches by limiting the situations
in which one with common authority over a residence assumes the risk
that a third party will consent to its search. The Randolph decision
makes it clear that the physical presence or absence of the nonconsenting
party is a vital aspect to evaluating the reasonableness of a residence
search conducted pursuant to third-party consent. 146 The Court's earlier

142. See infra Part V.B.
143. Chief Justice Roberts indicated in his dissent that the Court's rule would make it more
difficult for innocent occupants to disassociate or protect themselves from the criminal activity
occurring in the residence and might even prevent police from assisting in a domestic violence
126 S. Ct. at 1537-38 (Roberts, J., dissenting). These
situation. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at -,
policy concerns would be even less applicable if the Randolph rule were extended to vehicles.
Domestic abuse may be less likely to occur in vehicles because most vehicles are open to plain
view. Cf Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974) ("A car has little capacity for escaping
public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view."). It likewise may not be difficult for innocent parties with common authority over a vehicle
to distance themselves from the criminal activity occurring therein. A phone call to the police about
the criminal activities in which others with common authority over the vehicle are engaged may
provide police with sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle, particularly given the lesser
expectation of privacy in vehicles. Cf Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1984)
(finding that an informant's knowledge of incriminating evidence in the defendant's motor home
provided police with sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the motor home).
144. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
145. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
146. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519, 1526 (2006) (holding that a
search conducted of a residence pursuant to the consent of one occupant is unreasonable as to a
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jurisprudence indicates that this same restriction should also be extended
47
to the search of personal effects. Specifically, language in Matlock,
together with the Matlock Court's presentation of Frazier, 48 strongly
implies that the presence or absence of the nonconsenting party at the
time third-party consent is sought is pertinent to the reasonableness
of a
49
search, whether of a residence or of personal effects.1
The assumption-of-risk principle should likewise not apply to vehicle
searches when the defendant, an individual with common authority over
the vehicle, is physically present and expressly refuses to consent. The
Court acknowledges that a vehicle is a personal effect in which people
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy. 150 While the reasonable
expectation of privacy in a vehicle is lower than in a home,' 5 1 Matlock's
language and characterization of Frazierappear to limit the assumptionof-risk principle to absent individuals with common authority over a
residence or personal effect. 5 2 Thus, the Court's precedent suggests that
application of the assumption-of-risk principle is not conditioned on the
extent of protection afforded to the type of property searched. Courts
therefore should not apply the assumption-of-risk principle when one
with common authority over a vehicle is physically present and objects
to a search of the vehicle, even though individuals have a lesser
expectation of privacy in their vehicles than they do in their homes.
B.

An Individual'sReasonable Expectation of Privacy in Her Vehicle
Outweighs the Governmental Interest in Conductinga Warrantless
Vehicle Search Pursuantto Disputed Consent

Because the Court analyzes the validity of consent to search vehicles
in the same manner as for residences and other personal effects, disputed
consent adds no weight to the governmental interest in conducting a
nonconsenting, physically present co-occupant).
147. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170 (holding that the consent of one who possesses common authority
over a residence is valid against the absent, nonconsenting person).
148. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (holding that the defendant assumed the risk that
his cousin would allow someone to look into his duffel bag when he let his cousin use the bag and
left the bag at his cousin's house).
149. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
150. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
439 (1973).
151. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1970) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153-54(1925)).
152. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.

399
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warrantless vehicle search. 153 This conclusion is consistent with the
Court's determination in Randolph that conducting a search pursuant to
disputed consent is tantamount to conducting a search pursuant to no
consent at all. 154 Despite the fact that the Court recognizes a lower
expectation of privacy in a vehicle than in a residence, 155 the Court has
unequivocally stated that a warrantless search of a vehicle constitutes a
significant intrusion into its owner's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 156 When consent functions as the only justification for a vehicle
search-i.e., when police lack even the minimal level of suspicion
needed to conduct any other reasonable search of the vehicle 15 7-then
the governmental interest in conducting the warrantless search is weak.
That interest is even weaker when the validity of the consent is doubtful
because the defendant expressly objected to the search at the time
consent was sought. As a result, courts should conclude that such
searches, justified only by third-party consent, are unreasonable as to the
nonconsenting defendant because the defendant's reasonable expectation
of privacy in his vehicle outweighs the government's interest in the
search.
C.

The WarrantlessSearch of Cyrus's Vehicle Is Unreasonableas to
Cyrus Under the Fourth Amendment

Under the proposed extension of the Randolph rule, a court analyzing
the hypothetical fact pattern involving Cyrus and Sarah should hold that
Officer Calloway's search of the couple's car was unreasonable as to
Cyrus under the Fourth Amendment. Calloway did not have probable
cause to believe that his search would uncover evidence of a crime; all
he had was a hunch. Because no other vehicle exception applies, the
only justification for Calloway's search of the car is the consent he
received from Sarah. Although both Cyrus and Sarah possess actual
153. See supra Part 1IIB.

154. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. -_, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1523 (2006).
155. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (explaining that "the expectation
of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or
office").
156. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971) ("The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.").
157. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE § 3.10(a) (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that police often rely on consent searches to avoid
both time-consuming paper work and the need to establish probable cause).
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authority over the vehicle, Sarah's consent to the search is invalid as to
Cyrus because he was physically present at the time of the search and
expressly refused to consent. Therefore, under the proposed extension of
the Randolph rule, a court should conclude that the Fourth Amendment
condemns Calloway's search of the jointly owned vehicle as
unreasonable as to Cyrus.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts should extend the Randolph rule to searches of vehicles
conducted pursuant to third-party consent. No widely shared social
expectation exists whereby one with common authority over a vehicle
would admit a third party against the objection and in the presence of
another with common authority over the vehicle. Although the Fourth
Amendment recognizes a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle than
in a residence, the assumption-of-risk principle that normally justifies
searches conducted pursuant to third-party consent is inapplicable when
the nonconsenting party is physically present and objects to the
intrusion. Furthermore, the nonconsenting party's reasonable expectation
of privacy in the vehicle outweighs the government's interest in
conducting a warrantless search pursuant to disputed consent. Therefore,
courts should find that a warrantless search of a vehicle, conducted
pursuant to the consent of one with common authority over the vehicle
but over the express objection of a physically present party also
possessing common authority in the vehicle, is unreasonable as to the
nonconsenting party under the Fourth Amendment.
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